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Gift-giving, Reciprocity and the Creation of Trust
Abstract
This paper examines the role that gift giving plays in supplier-buyer relations, specifically, the 
role of gift giving and the creation of inter-organisational trust. Repeated inter-organisational 
exchanges in a mature industrial district are analysed using Mauss’ theoretical framework of gift-
giving, receiving and counter-giving. Actors in embedded network relationships frequently 
exchange gifts and favours as part of commercial exchanges. This gift giving is a fundamental 
part of the exchange relationship. Gift giving is found to be instrumental in creating and 
maintaining relationships, defining group and individual identity and resolving conflicts, thus 
contributing to the creation of trust between partners. Mauss’ theory of gift giving elaborates 
how this practise creates the conditions for reciprocity and induces trust. The originality of our 
findings lies in the fact that despite the dominant ideology of the purely altruistic gift, field 
research demonstrates that gifts do play a role in modern economic exchanges and that this 
ancient deeply rooted social custom should not be simply relegated to families, close friends and 
Christmas, but contributes to explaining the first step of trust and trust creation in repeated 
exchanges.
Keywords: gift-giving, reciprocity, trust, clusters, industrial districts, inter-organisation 
exchanges.
2I. Introduction
In many areas of academic research such as economics, organization theory and strategy, trust is 
considered a vital element of inter-firm relationships. Trust between exchange partners reduces 
transaction costs, increases future investment possibilities and facilitates the transfer of 
information (Sako, 1998, Li, 2012). Adler, (2001) argues that trusting relationships between 
agents (within and between organizations) will become more important as neither markets nor 
hierarchies are good at generating or transferring knowledge when compared to network 
structures such as those found in industrial districts (Bradach and Eccles, 1989, Jack and 
Anderson, 2002). The presence of trust between firms is a source of competitive advantage 
(Barney and Hansen, 1994). Trust may even be considered an ‘economic primitive’ i.e., a 
fundamental, underlying aspect of all exchanges (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995).
Trust contains a fundamental paradox: it is a mechanism used to reduce social uncertainty and 
yet it contains, in itself, uncertainty; for we may never be sure ex ante that our trust is well 
founded (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). The amount of knowledge necessary for trust is somewhere 
between total knowledge and total ignorance (Simmel, 1964 in McAllister, 1995) and it is the 
‘bracketing’ of this unknowable, and acting upon it, which is, in fact, the act of trusting 
(Möllering, 2006).
If there is consensus to the importance of trust, there are many aspects of trust which are not 
fully understood and worthy of ongoing research (see Bachmann, 2011 for a discussion). In this 
paper I will examine the paradox of explaining the first step in trusting as highlighted by 
Möllering (2006) and propose gift-giving as a possible answer to this problem. Having argued 
that gift-giving is fundamental to ‘the first step’ in trust, I will then examine the role of gift-
giving in ongoing relationships and negotiations between agents in the context of interdependent 
exchange relationships.
Möllering breaks down trust antecedents into three parts. Reason (essentially calculation based 
on information), routines (the existence of institutions which guide and govern our behaviour 
making others’ behaviour more predictable therefore more trustworthy) and finally, the common 
sense approach that trust builds slowly through repeated exchanges (reflexivity). And yet as 
Möllering notes, each of these three sources of trust cannot in themselves explain the leap of 
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Gouldner’s (1960) theory of reciprocity in order to throw light on what we may call the hitherto 
unexplained first step of trust. I support and illustrate my assertions through field work 
conducted in a French industrial district in the south-east of France; the Arve Valley bar-turning 
cluster. Research illustrates that in these manufacturing networks, managers use gifts (or 
favours) in order to form social bonds and generate the conditions of reciprocity so that receiving 
firms will feel obliged to supply a counter-gift (work, knowledge etc.) in the future, for as 
Gouldner (1960, 161), quoting Cicero, notes, ‘all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit’. 
The aim of this paper is to illustrate that despite the ideology of the altruistic gift which relegates 
them to purely personal, non-commercial contexts such as families and Christmas, gifts are part 
of modern exchanges, and play an important role in negotiations, contributing to the creation of 
relational governance and trust between partners. They are not pre-industrial relics of archaic 
exchange systems (Elder-Vaas, 2015).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, we shall examine social exchange theory and 
reciprocity in repeated exchanges. Gift-giving itself and its links to reciprocity are explained and 
analysed in section 2, while section 3 discusses the theoretical difficulty of explaining the first 
step of trust and how trust is developed through giving gifts. Methodology and field work are 
explained in section 4 and results are discussed in section 5.
1. Social exchange theory, reciprocity and trust
Social exchange theory (SET) posits that many exchanges carry more meaning, more 
implications and more connotations than straightforward ‘textbook’ economic transactions of 
instantaneous exchanges between anonymous agents (Emerson, 1976, Cropanzano and Mitchell, 
2005). SET anchors the economic in the social (cf. Granovetter, 1985, 1992, 2005). 
According to SET, modern economic life is coded and framed by the deep structures of cultural 
life, including, for example, gift-giving, altruism and norms and rules of reciprocity (Mauss, 
1950:1990, Becker, 1976, Gouldner 1960). As exchanges or negotiations are repeated over time 
they involve the concurrent transacting of both economic goods and social goods such as 
personal obligation, gratitude and trust. The result being outcomes that include both contractual 
and relational bonding. A central premise of SET is that ‘parties enter into and maintain 
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Spekman, 2001, 4). Equally, many researchers have found that relational control of exchanges is 
often an effective form of governance (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987, Lambe et al. 2001).
Central to my discussion of gift-giving and trust in negotiations is the notion of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behaviour. Trust extended to an unknown 
counterpart is based on the expectation of this reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960, Arrow, 1974, Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). SET literature outlines three reciprocity rules; reciprocity as 
interdependent exchanges, reciprocity as a folk belief and reciprocity as a norm and individual 
orientation. Lack of space precludes a detailed analysis of each, but this paper, like most 
management research, focuses on expectations of reciprocity in exchanges between 
interdependent firms exchanging repeatedly over time. Reciprocity as a folk belief stems from 
Mauss’ (1950:1990) and Malinkowski’s (1932) early work on primitive societies, and, as I will 
discuss below, this stream has led to the exclusion of the gift in modern economic analysis. 
Reciprocity as a norm is closely linked to folk belief, but includes a normative element of ought 
to, while individual orientation (possibly based on cultural attributes) is a mediating variable in 
an agent’s disposition to reciprocate or not, (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).
According to Liouakis and Reuer (2015), trust building behaviours depend on initial perceptions 
that a partner will reciprocate any benefits (including gifts), while in a process perspective, firms 
will analyse previous behaviour in order to predict when self-interested behaviour may occur. 
Zunk (2015) found that firms remembered past manifestations of benevolence and that assistance 
(a gift if not invoiced) in economically difficult times lead to feelings of gratitude on behalf of 
the receiving firm. As such, gift giving is an expression of benevolence; an indicator of 
trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995, Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007).
Indeed SET assumes that repeated interactions will lead to the creation of trust (Blau, 1964, 
Kong, Dirk and Ferrin, 2014, Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), although many researchers would 
consider this to be not necessarily the case (Grayson and Ambler, 1999). In summary, SET casts 
a wider net in helping us to analyse exchanges and is a promising framework to integrate 
negotiations, trust and the role of gift-giving. 
The gift exists in commercial exchanges (see Sako, 1988, Dyer and Chu, 2000, 2003, Uzzi, 
1997) and cannot be relegated to a purely altruistic form of behaviour and therefore excluded 
5from all exchange relationships (Ferrary, 2003). For example, in the Japanese automobile 
industry, Toyota has gained a reputation as a trustworthy partner because of its emphasis on long 
term relationships with suppliers and its reluctance to take advantage of partners’ vulnerability. 
Toyota frequently uses gifts (transfers of technical and managerial skills) to cement its 
relationships with suppliers and persuade them of their integrity (Dyer and Chu, 2000, 2003, 
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995).  Dore (1983) traces this modern Japanese business practice 
to traditional pre-capitalist arrangements including treating business relationships as personal 
relationships and the pattern of mid-summer and year-end gift giving which symbolises mutual 
obligations. 
2. The impossibility of trust
The sources of inter-organisational trust are difficult to trace. As mentioned in the introduction, 
we can find three theoretical approaches to this question, reason, routine and reflexivity 
(Möllering, 2006, Lane, 1998). Firstly, in rational choice theories, trust is reduced to a 
calculation of a) the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee, and b) the net gain or loss to the 
trustor if the trust offered is honoured or not (Coleman, 1990). The central heuristic of this model 
is that trustors will rationally trust if they perceive the trustee’s trustworthiness to be high enough 
to yield a net expected gain (Möllering, 2006). This approach is criticized by Lane (1998, 6). 
‘The model assumes an individual who is simultaneously highly prescient and aware of the 
limits of her rationality, who is able to completely divorce economic from social ties……this 
under socialised view, however finds limited acceptance among economic sociologists, and even 
among many economists’. Another criticism we could make of rational choice models is that 
they fail to explain how A trusts B when A has no information about B’s trustworthiness or if A 
does not have any mutually known intermediaries who could vouch for B’s trustworthiness? A is 
obliged to search for other reasons to trust. I shall propose gift giving as the key to understanding 
‘the first step in a game without history’ (Lane, 1998, 6).
The institutional approach to trust (routine for Möllering, 2006) avoids the ‘impossibility of 
calculativeness’ by assuming that, ‘the complexities of social organisation are so great that some 
assumptions of how people behave are necessary before we can start to calculate’, (Humphrey, 
1998, 218). Shared meanings, routines, roles and rules induce trust by making life less complex 
and more predictable, (Lane and Bachmann, 1996, drawing on the works of Luhmann). 
Institutions contribute to trusting behaviour because they enable actors to share a world in 
6common with others and rely on it (Möllering, 2006). Trust comes from a shared vision of the 
future. One of gift giving’s functions is to induce reciprocity and therefore creating positive 
expectations about an exchange partner’s future behaviour, thus facilitating trust (Mauss, 
1950:1990, Gouldner, 1960).
Thirdly, trust can be constructed by actors through repeated, open and communicative 
exchanges. If managed correctly, the process then becomes a self-fulfilling upward spiral of trust 
creation because trust begets trust as social exchange theory suggests (Kong, Dirks and Ferrin, 
2014). The process based approach to trust gives a large place to the agency of the actors 
concerned. Actors are not just passive entities bound by institutions or making trust decisions 
according to calculations or behavioural norms. They are active in creating trust through 
interaction and communication. Actors never fully control the process, as exchange partners 
remain necessarily opaque, but through ‘signals, communication, interaction and interpretation’ 
(Möllering, 2006, p.79), they may create trust in a continuous learning process. Gift giving 
during exchanges and negotiations communicates benevolence and a willingness to form social 
bonds (Blau, 1964). As noted above, gift-giving will be proposed as a way of explaining the first 
step to trust and field research detailed below underlines its role in ‘rounding out the angles’ in 
negotiations and contributing to maintaining relationships.
Each of these three approaches has clear limitations and each can only go so far in explaining the 
creation of trust. The rational choice model runs repeatedly into paradoxes that require ‘fixing’ 
by adding on elements to rational choice or game theory models. Even taking into account the 
‘shadow of the future’, where agents know that future exchanges will be influenced by their 
behaviour in the current round of exchanges (Axelrod, 1984), the backward induction argument 
(where opportunistic agents will cheat on the penultimate exchange, but if this is their strategy 
and the trustor knows it, then every exchange becomes the last but one and nobody trusts) makes 
it difficult to envisage agents taking the first step to trust, (Hollis, 2006). An institutional 
explanation suggests that people often trust through habit, by taking it for granted. Institutionalist 
approaches do not eliminate agency which remains the central feature of trust. Perhaps a more 
process orientated approach would help us to understand the creation of trust. It is, after all, 
common knowledge that trust is built up slowly through ongoing interactions. It may grow and 
prosper if both parties make efforts and display their ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et 
al., 1995). Actors, however, are assumed to build on a first step towards trust, but we have 
7difficulty comprehending how and why actors ‘just do it’. The first step to trusting remains as 
elusive as ever. In this paper I propose gift-giving as the first step of trust creation. 
3. The gift
The seminal works of Mauss and Malinowski were based on anthropological work done in 
‘primitive’ societies. Many other ethnologists and anthropologists have since followed in their 
footsteps by examining gift-giving in different pre-industrial and ‘archaic’ societies. This has 
allowed theorists to relegate gift giving to pre-modern societies through the ideology of the 
purely altruistic gift. Gifts are considered part of archaic or primitive social systems. Indeed the 
title of Mauss’ original work suggested as much1. The sharp division between altruism and 
egoism has placed gift giving outside modern economic thought. Gifts are not throwbacks to pre-
industrial society but gift giving and the reciprocity it engenders continue to play fundamental 
roles in social and economic life. 
Mauss’ concept of the ‘total social fact’ comprises 3 concepts (Adloff, 2006, 426);
1) Gift exchange encompasses all aspects of social life: politics, religion, economic law, 
morality etc., 
2) Gift exchange permeates the entire society and, most importantly in our investigation, 
3) It can be found in all societies both modern and archaic. 
The gift is an invitation to a partnership (Sherry, 1983) and performs four functions; 
communication, social exchange, economic exchange and socialisation. Each function reflects on 
the other (Belk, 1979). Mauss’ (1950:1990) theory of the gift is based on a three step process of 
gift-giving, receiving and counter-giving;
- The receiving actor can accept or reject the gift. Rejection symbolises refusal to enter into 
a relationship while accepting implies openness to the proposed relationship.
- Counter giving means the relationship is maintained. One gives something different. This 
new gift permits an evaluation of the perception the other has of oneself.
- The value of the gift is not imposed but the exchange involves the donor personally.
1
 Mauss, M, (1924), ‘Essai sur le Don ; Forme Archaique de l’Exchange’
8While virtually any resource, tangible or intangible can be transformed into a gift (Sherry, 1983, 
Ferrary 2003), Mauss distinguishes two types. A soliciting gift where the receiver is incited to 
accept and make a counter gift in order to enter into a process of creating social links (e.g. 
flowers or chocolates from a suitor), and locking gifts designed to make a partner cross over an 
irreversible barrier (an engagement ring for example). The modern definition of the gift is ‘free, 
in the sense of being one way’, ‘what we abandon to someone without receiving anything in 
return’ (Godbout, 2004, 6). We should note however that the Maussian concept of the gift 
maintains that there is no such thing as a free gift and that all gifts demand a counter-gift; 
otherwise the receiver will always be indebted to the giver. The more intense the relationship, the 
more the exchange will take place via the gift, the more the exchange will be distanced from a 
strict logic of market equivalence (Godbout, 2004). The social bond created by gift giving may 
serve a variety of purposes and agents may have different objectives in mind when giving, but 
we give, receive or refuse strategically (Sherry, 1983). It can be boundary defining (denoting in-
groups versus out-groups), as shown by Uzzi’s (1997, 47) example quoting a manager 
mentioning that he would make gifts to suppliers (in terms of according delays or helping with 
investments) but ‘never to a stranger’. The lapse between gift and counter gift is trust inducing in 
the sense that the norm of reciprocity ‘obliges’ the receiver to take action to remove their ‘debt’. 
The ideology of the altruistic gift
Gift giving has been largely excluded from the analysis of modern capitalism (Bourdieu, 1997, 
Chanial, 2008, Elder-Vaas, 2015). Gifts are perceived as throwbacks to pre-industrial, pre-
market epochs. Neo-liberal economics, based on rational utilitarian maximisers, has no place for 
gift giving and has relegated this ancient and deeply rooted social custom either to the family and 
private realm, or dismisses it through the ideology of the purely altruistic gift. ‘Once the radical 
disjuncture between the logic of egoism and the logic of altruism has been established, the gift 
becomes unthinkable for modern thinkers’ (Adloff, 2006, 416). Parry (1985, 458) notes that ‘the 
ideology of a disinterested gift emerges in parallel with an ideology of a purely interested 
exchange’. 
Ferrary’s 2003 study of venture capitalists in the Silicon Valley cluster focuses on the circulation 
of information (technical and reputational) amongst valley actors. Ferrary’s analysis is grounded 
in the fact that there is no market for information through either convention (a journalist does not 
pay a CEO for information, nor does one make a friend or acquaintance pay for one’s opinion of 
9the reputation of a third party) or by law (an engineer is held to silence by his employer and 
cannot sell his knowledge whilst still an employee). Therefore, for Ferrary, information 
exchanges as gifts co-exist in parallel with other commercial exchanges in the district.
However, Darr (2003, quoted in Dolfsma, van der Eijk and Jolink, 2009) and Carrier (1991) both 
maintain that gift exchange and market exchange are inextricably intertwined in contemporary 
markets. Field research presented below demonstrates that gifts and markets are part of the same 
transaction processes. Using the gift as an analytical lens allows us an alternative regard on the 
creation of trust in on-going negotiations. 
 Gift giving and reciprocity
On the surface, the gift indicates the refusal of egotistical calculation; it is generous and free of 
obligation. But simultaneously, it is never entirely void of the logic of exchange and related 
constraints and costs (Bourdieu, 1997). The relationship between giver and receiver is never 
simple because ‘the hand that receives is always below the hand that gives’2. The act of giving 
places the receiver in a position of obligation. Central to Mauss’ work on the gift is the idea that 
the gift demands a counter-gift in order to release the receiver from their obligations. As the 
counter-gift cannot be identical to the initial gift (what would be the point?), the initial giver 
must respond with another gift and so on and so on. The open endedness of the Maussian process 
goes beyond simple economic give and take (Chanial, 2008). If there is a message to be taken 
from Mauss’s (1950: 1990) work, it is that no gift is based on purely altruistic motives. 
Reciprocating the gift releases the receiver from the obligation created and, at the same time 
creates (or maintains) a social bond (Mauss, 1950: 1990). The purpose of gift-giving is ‘to indebt 
the other party into giving favours in the future’ (Sako, 1998, 101). Falk and Fischbacher (2006) 
note that there is a strong positive and negative reciprocity according to first mover’s actions, 





Summary and research question
The gift is not a ‘left-over’ from ancient times. It fulfils the following social roles. Gifts create 
and maintain social bonds. These bonds are not an end in themselves. They are created and used 
for many different purposes, including the exchange and appropriation of economic, symbolic 
and social benefits (Cheal, 1988, Weinbrun, 2006). Gifts demonstrate the intentions of the 
partner in the exchange (Camerer, 1988). As such, they show benevolence which is an important 
element in perceiving/demonstrating trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995). Gift giving demands 
reciprocity. Refusing a gift signals the desire not to enter into a relationship, while refusal to 
reciprocate signals an inherent untrustworthiness because this refusal is a signal that there may 
not be future exchanges. In the same vein, refusal to reciprocate may indicate a lack of integrity, 
the third of Mayer et al.’s (1995) triumvirate of trust signals.
Faced with an ideology hostile to the very idea that gift-giving may play a role in inter-
organisational relationships and the creation of trust, our first research question is simple. Do 
actors in industrial districts give gifts? What forms do these gifts take? What role does gift 
giving play in inter-organizational relationships in industrial districts? Our second question is; 
how does gift giving influence the construction of characteristic and process-based trust 
creation?
4. Methodology
The Arve Valley industrial district is characterised by a large number (over 400) of small (88% 
employ less than 50 employees) family owned ‘décolleteurs’ or Bar-turners3. (Barabel, Huault 
and Meier, 2007). The firms are geographically concentrated in a 10 by 15 km valley around the 
small town of Cluses, situated approximately 45 km from Geneva. Each firm is highly 
specialised in terms of what kind of metal is worked (steel, stainless steel, copper etc.) and in 
their production output. They are highly interdependent and constitute loose, fluid production 
networks where contractors may inverse roles, becoming by turns clients of their own 
subcontractors according to work flows, spare capacity and specific competencies etc., in a 
production model labelled flexible specialisation. Pieces and components may undergo several 
different operations and pass through several production stages in different district firms.
3
 Bar-turners use computer controlled lathes to produce a large variety of components from metal bars. They were originally 
screw and bolt manufacturers (Barabel et al., 2007).
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In total, 23 in-depth interviews were conducted, each lasting approximately one hour to an hour 
and a half, with the owner managers of small bar-turning firms. 19 of the firms were family-
owned, some of which were in their 3rd or 4th generation of owners. The smallest firm employed 
2 workers, the largest had 46 employees. Only owner managers were interviewed. Open-ended 
questions were designed to provoke discussion about inter-firm relationships (with both district 
and non-district firms), conflict resolution, selecting new suppliers and subcontractors, etc. There 
seemed little point in asking owners about ‘gifts’ made and received as this would probably be 
interpreted as naïve behaviour. (The interview guide is joined in appendices 1).
Interviews were transcribed and then manually coded using themes such as cooperation, 
tolerance, norms and values, interdependence, social and/or organisational proximity, identity, 
sources of information, stocks, clients, and evidence of trust/distrust. The final findings represent 
a total of approximately 8 pages of tables and grids which reveal how gifts were used to create 
bonds and trust and to ‘round out edges’ in repeated negotiations, as will be discussed below.
1. Research results
Difficult to define precisely, a gift is something that is neither solicited nor demanded. A gift is 
not reciprocated immediately; the desired and expected counter gift is deferred and its nature is 
not specified (otherwise this would be an exchange, a swap or a bribe). The contract is uncertain 
and informal (Ferrary, 2003). We have chosen the following examples of gift giving which will 
be discussed in the following section.
Example 1. Subcontracting out work among peers. 
It is possible to argue that giving work to a subcontractor does not qualify as a gift. If one’s 
company cannot do a particular operation then one is obliged to find a partner who can. This is 
not a gift but a straightforward commercial transaction. 
The situation is different in a mature industrial district because bar-turning firms in the district 
are extremely homogenous. They use the same machines (numerically operated lathes) and the 
same techniques (often learnt at the same technical colleges). 90% of the firms have fewer than 
50 employees and they have very similar costs. As bar-turners do not manufacture their own 
products, there no space for product differentiation. As such, many firms are interchangeable and 
a large number of them could make the same piece for the same price. Managers in the Arve 
Valley industrial district can choose among literally dozens of qualified companies within a 
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relatively small geographic area. It is difficult to obtain lower prices from suppliers or local sub-
contractors because managers know the costs and therefore the margins of other firms. Why then 
should a manager choose one firm over another?
The manager chooses the company with which they wish to create a relationship. The gift of 
work is a boundary defining strategy; inviting a colleague/competitor into one’s inner circle, 
(Cherry, 1983). It is an invitation to begin a relationship. The manager who gives work to 
another firm expects the job to done correctly (reputations in networks are important) but also 
will expect reciprocity in the future. The choice of partner depends not only on technical 
competence but also what the other firm can give in return at an undefined moment in the future 
such as more work in return or technical assistance. The offer of work is the first step to creating 
a trusting working relationship where small firms in the district band together in fluid production 
networks, strengthening the competitive advantage of each firm and creating and maintaining 
knowledge conduits. As Manager 6 noted ‘we are on equal footing, we need each other’. 
Manager 12 said, ‘it’s a win-win situation with sub-contractors’, while Manager 18 underlined 
the importance of helping each other out and Manager 8 said ‘we make efforts for friends’.
What is striking and typical of sub-contracting relationships in districts is the cooperative spirit 
amongst protagonists (‘there’s enough work for everybody, even in this recession’ according to 
Manager 6). Other bar-turners are not considered competitors (Manager 2). There is very little 
discussion concerning prices and little pressure put on subcontractors’ margins because the firms 
in the district have very similar cost structures, everyone knows their hourly rates, the 
amortization costs and running costs etc., plus the time expected to make the a particular piece. 
As such, industrial districts can be assimilated to highly transparent community markets 
(Maskell, Lorenzen, 2004, Storper, 2005). Subcontractors cannot ‘give a price too high or too 
low, it would be noticed rapidly’ (Managers 6, 11, 14, 17). There is a ‘right’ price that everyone 
knows. Pressuring a subcontractor to offer a price below what is acceptable occurs but is not 
common, except in the context of an outside customer demanding lower prices from their 
supplier (i.e. the contractor).
When a district bar-turner gives work to a colleague there are in fact two gifts taking place. The 
first, as discussed above, is a soliciting gift (Mauss 1950:1990) which creates the relationship. 
The second gift is that of a ‘decent’ or ‘living’ margin accorded to a colleague (i.e. not 
considered a competitor, as mentioned above) who is similar to the contractor. Most clients are 
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external to the district. A bar-turner who shares an order with another will also share the margins 
(generally a 10/30% split, 10% to the firm who has the outside client and only handles the 
administrative activities for this part of the total order). The margin (i.e. money) is thus obtained 
from outside the district and re-distributed inside the district through each firm’s manufacturing 
networks. The work is accepted if the prices and conditions are ‘decent’ and ‘respectable’. In 
terms of counter gift, the initial firm expects reciprocity in the form of work being sent their way 
in the future. The gift of giving work begins the relationship and sets up the context for the 
counter gift.
Example 2. Knowledge transfer.
Proximity literature (Gertler, 2003) assumes that tacit knowledge transfer is easier between 
agents with similar cultures, mental frameworks etc. This second example is similar to Ferrary’s 
(2003) discussion of information transfer in Silicon Valley.
In the networked relations between local bar-turners there were frequent exchanges of 
information thanks in part to geographic proximity (Managers 12 and 15). This example occurs 
where a bar-turner (Manager 13) transferred tacit knowledge about a particular operation when 
the subcontractor was experiencing difficulties. In this industry, bar-turners are sub-contractors. 
They do not have their own products or brands. Their survival lies, in a large part, on their 
mastery of their craft, in their tacit skills. Transferring tacit knowledge without asking for 
specific reciprocity (payment, sharing of information etc.) constitutes a gift. A gift that binds the 
receiving party to giver. The firm giving the information retained power over the receiving firm 
and knew that they could one day ‘call in the favour’. 
The gift of knowledge to the subcontractor obliged the smaller firm to ‘play the game’, i.e. to 
make the pieces to the required quality, (no opportunistic short cuts) and respect delivery delays 
because reputation effects are strong inside networks.
Example 3. Conflict resolution.
It would be naïve to picture industrial districts as conflict free production networks where 
cooperation reigns supreme and conflict is entirely absent and this example perhaps illustrates 
the best the role of gift-giving in repeated negotiations. Managers seem to avoid conflict and 
prone long term relationships thanks to a local norm of preferring voice (openness) over exit. In 
discussions with managers I have frequently seen subcontracting firms ‘round out the angles’ 
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during a dispute about sharing the cost of a ‘mistake’ (Manager 6 admitted that he may be too 
lenient). The ‘problem’ (often a question of substandard quality of a piece) was frequently 
deliberately interpreted as a mistake rather than as opportunistic behaviour (for example, ‘the 
workers, not the bosses make the mistakes’, Manager 8). This was done in order for the 
relationship to continue. ‘We do it in such a way as to make sure that the person (subcontractor) 
doesn’t lose too much money’. ‘The goal is not to get rich from the supplier…the working 
relationship goes on’ (Manager 7). This being a clear example of the gift in negotiating a 
manufacturing problem because the receiving firm was clearly expected to behave better next 
time round. Take the case of an error which was admitted by the local subcontractor (after 
discussion), to which a cost was mutually agreed. The contractor (in the right and in a position of 
power) agreed to split costs 60%:40%. The gift to the supplier amounted to approximately 200 to 
300 Euros. Manager 7 explained his logic when dealing with a problem concerning the quality of 
a piece coming from a (local) sub-contractor and destined for an ‘outside’ client, ‘sometimes it’s 
not my fault, but I accept to pay part (of the repairs), because I privilege the long term 
relationship’, ‘I pay part (of the costs), so as not to put (the supplier) in difficulties, I know how 
to share’.
4. Discussion : The role of the gift in repeated exchanges
4a. Gift giving as an invitation to form a relationship and define in group and out group 
boundaries
In example N°1 above, we can see how the gift of work fulfils 2 roles. It begins the exchange 
with a signal of benevolence (the gift of a margin), inviting an honest and trustworthy response. 
It signals the invitation to a relationship (Belk, 1979). Secondly, the gift (the work itself and 
more importantly a ‘living’ margin) defines who we are (bar-turners exercising a particular craft 
in accordance to particular rules and norms) as opposed to others (outside clients, purchasers, 
automobile companies etc.). The gift of a ‘living’ margin here is money extracted from external 
firms and distributed among the district ‘clan’. Managers in industrial districts frequently 
assimilate their firms’ interests’ to the district's interests (Dei Ottati, 1991). Work coming in 
from clients outside the district seems to belong to the district rather than any one firm as 
example 1 above shows (an extreme example perhaps but common enough in district literature 
and indicative of the community mentality found in many industrial districts, see Mathews and 
Stokes, 2013). Repeated interactions, exchanges and transactions generate a micro social order 
15
where over time participants feel a sense of network cohesion. Positive feelings are directed 
towards the other actors and the overarching network (Lawler, Thye and Yoon, 2008, 
Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Gifts contribute to this feeling of belonging because ‘accepting 
a gift is (in part) accepting an identity, refusing a gift is to refuse a definition of oneself….Gifts 
are one of the ways with which others transmit a message of the image they have of us’ 
(Schwartz, 1967, quoted in Godbout, 2004, 17). Gifts define individuals and strengthen their 
identities (you and I are bar-turners and we share certain values and norms). 
The construction of a group identity shifts the exchange from the impersonal and calculus based 
to the personal and affect level (Lawler et al., 2008). It creates the emotional bond that facilitates 
trust (Lewis and Weigirt, 1985) and reassures trustors that partners are part of the same 
community and adhere to group rules and codes, i.e., that they play the game according to the 
same rules and will be less likely to break the rules and behave opportunistically. This is 
characteristic based trust (Zucker, 1986). It reassures the trustor that the first step (in trusting 
‘blindly’) is a small and almost inconsequential risk.
4b. Gift giving in starting and maintaining the relationship
Giving knowledge to a subcontractor (example 2) is a substantial gift particularly when it may 
permit the subcontractor in question to become a competitor in the future. The contracting firm 
seems to be taking an inconsiderate risk in this example. From our discussions it seemed clear 
that the giver had very strong expectations of reciprocity from the sub-contractor even though 
they were aware that ‘some don’t play the game’. This gift could be assimilated to a locking gift 
as described above. The goal is to draw the subcontractor into the relationship with a substantial 
gift which forces the partner to stay loyal to the relationship. Breaking the bond (i.e. not 
returning the gift in the form of quality and delay) would have serious consequences in terms of 
reputation in district networks. In effect, the bigger the gift, the larger the debt, the stronger the 
obligation to return the favour. How could one trust a firm that refused to respond to such initial 
generosity?
Gift-giving and counter giving is necessarily always delayed (Bourdieu, 1972). It involves a trust 
inducing time lapse. Initially, it is an open-ended investment that demands reciprocity and this 
expectation of reciprocity makes future actions more predictable, thus trust inducing. It is the 
first step on the path to process-based inter-personal trust creation (Zucker, 1986, Möllering, 
2006). The gift is but a moment in a relationship structured by reciprocity. Because the donor 
does not demand immediate compensation, the timing and nature of the counter gift is left to the 
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discretion of the receiver. Again, gift giving signals a shift from calculus based trust to relational 
trust (Klapwijk and van Lange, 2009). But the delay between giving and counter-giving induces 
an element of suspense and uncertainty. Gifts are ‘credit slips’ (Coleman, 1990, Ferrary, 2003). 
They are favours to be called upon in the future, and as such trust inducing because of the 
strength of the norm of reciprocity in locally based network where reputational effects are strong.
Gifts convey meaning in the socialisation process that transforms individuals ‘from egocentric 
actors with little sense of obligations to others…into members of a community with a 
commitment to the common good’ (Adler and Kwon, 2002, 26).
Gift giving and the counter gift, a never ending game of exchanges, allows actors to escape the 
crippling backward induction argument and paves the way for Arrow’s shadow of the future. In 
order for trust to be built, agents must refer to this structural property of reciprocity to create the 
corresponding expectations of continued exchanges (Sydow, 1998). The feedback process and 
information processing (trust proposed/trust denied), contribute to virtuous or vicious circles of 
trust creation or trust destruction. 
4c. Conflict management
In the conflicts and negotiations described in example 3 above, agents made allowances for 
others’ behaviours in order to continue trusting their exchange partners. A problem of quality, 
for example, will be interpreted at the beginning as a simple error. But agents are not stupid and 
do not naively discount opportunism forever; ‘once is rare, twice is ok, but three times is bad 
faith’. Uzzi (1997) also noted actors’ capacity to interpret partners’ actions in a positive light 
until proof of opportunism was available. The gift is a signal of good intentions (Camerer, 1988), 
especially the gift of not exploiting the vulnerability of a partner who has made a costly mistake. 
The gift signals the intention of continuing the relationship, despite the hiccup of an error. If 
there are opportunistic agents in the population of possible partners an honest agent will use a 
gift in order to signal trustworthiness. 
Game strategists have studied trust and opportunism in great detail. The prisoner’s dilemma is a 
classic trust game where a rational decision taken by an individual (not trusting the other 
criminal) leads to a suboptimal result for both players (they both receive a higher prison sentence 
than if they had trusted the other). In order to solve this social dilemma, Axelrod (1984) devised 
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a competition inviting scholars to propose a strategy that would provide the highest payoff and 
win against all other strategies in the computer tournament. The winner was a simple ‘tit for tat’ 
strategy where an actor starts by cooperating and then does whatever the other has done in the 
previous round. This simple and elegant strategy has the advantage of allowing actors to learn 
from their partner’s behaviour and adjust their strategy accordingly. Tit for tat strategy works 
best in games where numbers are small and reputational effects are strong (Carmicheal and 
MaCleod, 1997) as is the case in industrial districts. 
However, like all models, Axelrod’s tit for tat strategy is based on a certain number of assumed 
axioms, one of which is perfect communication. An axiom which sits badly with real life. 
Industrial districts may be ‘transparent markets’ (Maskell and Lorenzen, 2004), and district 
actors may be part of tight overlapping social and business networks which convey salient up to 
date information about potential partners and their reputations. They may possess similar 
codebooks and mental schema which permit fine grained communication, but again, this 
description represents an ideal type and should not be taken as reality. What happens when 
‘negative noise’ (Klapwijk and van Lange, 2009) interferes with the communication process and 
partners behave less cooperatively than intended? If a partner is perceived to be behaving in an 
untrustworthy manner, then, according to the tit for tat strategy, the other partner would retaliate 
and therefore start a down spiral of distrust.
Two possible solutions have been advanced and both are open to examination using gift giving 
as an analytical lens. The idea of serial equity (Kollock ,1993), where actors believe that things 
will ‘balance out’ in the long run is nothing other than the ongoing process of gift-giving, 
receiving and counter giving. Kollock found that actors in trust games who relaxed their 
‘accounting systems’, ‘dampened cycles of recrimination’ (ibid, 784). What Kollock calls 
‘flexible accounting systems’, achieved the balance between vulnerability to exploitation and 
recrimination. In other words, actors who accepted the open endedness of the circulation of gifts 
avoided the pitfalls of negative noise in their ongoing exchanges. The second solution, 
generosity, is simple, but contradicts the paradigm of homo œconomicus. In tit for tat strategies, 
when one partner reduces cooperation, the other will follow suit, but generosity (i.e. gift-giving) 
by one player serves to communicate trust. Klapwijk and van Lange (2009, 100) find that 
generosity serves to improve the ‘overall mood… which may very well help people give others 
the benefit of the doubt’.
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5  Conclusion
Gift giving and trusting share many similar qualities. They are both strongly anchored in agency: 
trust or not, give, receive and return or not are individual level dilemmas. Gift giving acts on the 
personal level, trust is an inherently personal level phenomena. Both gift giving and trusting are 
profoundly social phenomena. Gift giving reinforces social bonds and embeds the relationship in 
the affect. In terms of trust, this embedding process reinforces personal, micro, or one to one 
trust through creating identity, both individual and group. Being part of the same social group 
which obeys the same institutional framework facilitates trust because it limits social uncertainty 
and vulnerability (Zucker, 1986). Personal level governance mechanisms are more powerful than 
impersonal mechanisms (Granovetter, 1985). 
The Maussian process described above is central to reciprocity (Levi-Straus, 1967) as most gifts 
are used as ‘credit-slips’ (Coleman, 1990, Ferrary, 2003); i.e. favours to be called upon in the 
future. As we have mentioned above, the gift demands a counter gift as we feel a debt towards 
those who have proffered the initial gift, even more so if the initial gift has a spontaneous and 
voluntary character (Parry, 1985). Gift-giving in repeated negotiations has the express objective 
of creating a debt that the receiver will attempt to alleviate, opening the door to repeated 
exchanges because the counter gift is never the same as the initial one. The weight of this debt 
and the obligation of repayment incurred is an attempt by the giver to control the partner and 
govern the exchanges through relational governance. This expectation of reciprocity varies in 
strength according to the different cultural, institutional and structural arrangements (Sydow, 
1998). It is the second step on the path to process-based inter-personal trust creation (Zucker, 
1986, Möllering, 2006). The diachronic nature of gift-giving and counter giving necessarily 
involves a trust inducing time lapse.  
The gift of trust is the first step on the path of process based trust creation. To refuse a gift or 
refuse to reciprocate trust is to put oneself beyond the bounds of society, particularly in a close 
knit networked society such as an industrial district. Giving trust increases trust as it engenders 
reciprocity, so that when we trust others they become more likely to trust us (Luhmann, 1979). In 
a continuing game of negotiations, agents juggle commercial and economic goals with personal 
and social goals. Gifts provide the link between the two.
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Appendice 1: Interview guide
Introduction. Outline reasons for interview. Thank manager for time spent.
- How long in industry, born in the valley, trained in the valley?
- Family firm? History of family firm? Other family members in industry?
- Children in industry? Children having difficulty finding work experience in other firms?
- Problems of ‘spying’ on other firms?
- If manager from outside… problems of integration, what problems, why these problems 
exist?
Relationships with other bar-turners and suppliers
- Sub-contracting arrangements. With how many other bar-turners? Mutual 
subcontracting? Who was latest entrant into network? How chosen? What problems have 
arisen, if any, what are they, how were they resolved? How are prices decided?
- Suppliers, problems, what types, which suppliers, how were they resolved?
Relationships with customers
- Problems, resolution etc. as above.
- Professional buyers, types of clients.
- Stocks, do you make stocks? With contract or not? How much of CA is tied up in stocks. 
Why? Deception and attitudes towards the question of stocks…
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